The title is an understatement: Heterogeneity in psychiatric diagnostic classification. This is a paper in Psychiatry Research by Kate Allsopp, John Read, Rhiannon Corcoran, and Peter Kinderman.
Abstract (to which I added paragraphifications):
The theory and practice of psychiatric diagnosis are central yet contentious. This paper examines the heterogeneous nature of categories within the DSM-5, how this heterogeneity is expressed across diagnostic criteria, and its consequences for clinicians, clients, and the diagnostic model. Selected chapters of the DSM-5 were thematically analysed: schizophrenia spectrum and other psychotic disorders; bipolar and related disorders; depressive disorders; anxiety disorders; and trauma- and stressor-related disorders.
Themes identified heterogeneity in specific diagnostic criteria, including symptom comparators, duration of difficulties, indicators of severity, and perspective used to assess difficulties.
Wider variations across diagnostic categories examined symptom overlap across categories, and the role of trauma. Pragmatic criteria and difficulties that recur across multiple diagnostic categories offer flexibility for the clinician, but undermine the model of discrete categories of disorder.
This nevertheless has implications for the way cause is conceptualised, such as implying that trauma affects only a limited number of diagnoses despite increasing evidence to the contrary. Individual experiences and specific causal pathways within diagnostic categories may also be obscured. A pragmatic approach to psychiatric assessment, allowing for recognition of individual experience, may therefore be a more effective way of understanding distress than maintaining commitment to a disingenuous categorical system
Notice that they skipped the politically controversial subject of gender dysphoria. Had they tackled that, “activists” would have had a volcanic fit, and four professors would be out looking for a job. (Is there such a diagnosis of volcanic fit frenzy? I ask in earnestness.)
Now, that we all know this is true is also proof that psychiatric diagnoses, at least in politically controversial subjects, can be rank nonsense. If a psychiatrist fears to make a diagnosis which he believes is correct, then it is proof that outside motivating forces which should play no role in diagnosis do in fact influence decisions. Thus we don’t know what to believe—or who to trust.
This is particularly important in Tranny Madness situations, where young children are being physically and permanently mutilated by fee-charging surgeons. Surgeons who ply their dull knives using psychiatric diagnoses as their justification for getting rich. (See Saturday’s The Week In Doom, where this subject is tackled.)
It’s not only politics. It’s the the inherent uncertainty in mapping outward behavior with inward states.
…there are almost 24,000 possible symptom combinations for panic disorder in DSM-5, compared with just one possible combination for social phobia (Galatzer-Levy and Bryant, 2013). Olbert and colleagues (2014) also report considerable heterogeneity within the criteria of individual diagnoses, showing that in the majority of diagnoses in both DSM-IV-TR and DSM-5 (64% and 58.3% respectively), two people could receive the same diagnosis without sharing any common symptoms. Such ‘disjunctive’ categories have been described as scientifically meaningless. [My emphasis.]
Since science is what can be measured, a psychiatric illness that can’t be measured (reliably) isn’t science.
And, indeed, not all about our mental states is science. Read Introduction to the Science of Mental Health by Fr. Chad A. Ripperger for much insight. (Those men needing to get in shape can also use this book for a weight-lifting substitute.)
A scientist or psychiatrist who makes a judgment in an area which is not scientific, but which he thinks is, means he is substituting a prejudice. Now this prejudice may even be a good or true one, but that a scientist holds the prejudice doesn’t make it science. For instance, it is metaphysically impossible for a man to “transition into” a woman. This is a true proposition not known (exclusively) scientifically. A scientist or psychiatrist who thinks this impossibility can be accomplished is thus substituting a prejudice.
The limitations of madness are not fully limned. This paper proves it, but in only a handful of areas. Yet, somehow, “Mental health disorders on the rise globally” (original source).
What that headline means is that mental health diagnoses are on the rise. Whether people are truly becoming crazier has to be tackled on a malady-by-malady basis. People are certainly losing grasp on Reality in sexual matters, but that is not (for almost all) because of psychiatric disorders.
All we know for sure is that it is becoming easier to be diagnosed as nuts, and therefore to be in need of the paid services of doctors and pharmaceutical companies. To blame this only on doctors would be wrong. But it wouldn’t be very wrong